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MAKING CONDITIONS CONSTITUTIONAL
BY ATTACHING THEM TO WELFARE:

THE DANGERS OF
SELECTIVE CONTEXTUAL IGNORANCE
OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
JULIE A. NICE*

Context matters, but it shouldn't. In this essay, I suggest that the context
in which unconstitutional conditions problems arise may determine whether
courts apply or ignore the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Supreme
Court decisions that I explore reveal the Court's application of heightened
scrutiny to conditions that burden unemployment insurance and building permits-popular government benefits-but mere rationality review to conditions
that burden welfare-an unpopular government benefit. Should courts apply
more lenient standards of review to conditions attached to unpopular benefits?
Or should each provision of the Constitution be applied consistently regardless
of the popularity of the benefit being conditioned? I suggest that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires consistent application of the level of scrutiny that the Court normally applies for each constitutional provision, regardless of the type of benefit at issue.
My focus on the issue of context arises from the specific history of this
symposium issue. Several faculty members at the University of Denver College of Law encountered unconstitutional conditions problems within their
particular areas of study. Although these areas of study were quite diverse, we
each reported a similar frustration with the selective application of the doctrine
and the lack of a consensus identifying a coherent theoretical framework underlying the doctrine. We knew that many fine scholars with considerably
more experience had attempted to analyze the doctrine, without reaching con-
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coordinating this symposium. I thank Martha Ertman separately for revisiting my ideas in countless conversations.
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sensus.' But we believed that the importance of the doctrine across constitutional law justified further thought on the subject.
Because many of us were studying the doctrine in different contexts, we
planned a round-table symposium 2 to explore whether more could be learned
about the doctrine by carefully examining the similarities and differences in its
cross-context application. The symposium discussion occurred in March of
1995, with provocative participants and thoughtful debate. Several participants
continued their dialogue over the summer, finally resulting in this symposium
issue.
For my part, I focus on challenges to unconstitutional conditions on welfare benefits. I criticize the result that seems nearly preordained for welfare
recipients: when courts encounter arguably unconstitutional conditions attached
to welfare, they tend to uphold those conditions (regardless of the strength of
the constitutional guarantee at issue), although they would apply full review to
a non-welfare condition. I first explore the basic role played by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Part I, then attempt in Part II to reveal how courts
pervert the doctrine, usually by ignoring it, in the context of welfare benefits.
I argue in Part 11 that courts should not selectively ignore or apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine based on the type of government benefit at
issue.
I. THE CONTEXT-NEUTRAL UNCONSTrrUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
We live in a constitutional republic that limits the power of both federal
and state governments. The Constitution generally prohibits the government
from abridging various rights guaranteed to individuals, including the rights to
be free from government interference with the free exercise of one's religion4
and from government taking private property without just compensation.'

1. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1988); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990).
2. Our decision about how to organize this conversation depended primarily on our determination to avoid a colloquium format typified by panelists presenting a canned speech followed
by limited time to respond to questions from an audience too large to allow full participation. Instead, we wanted to structure the event so that all participants enjoyed both the time and the opportunity to participate in a more round-table conversation. Both the organizers and the invited
guests seemed quite pleased with the quality of the dialogue resulting from this approach.
3. I refer to "government" because courts generally have extended the Bill of Rights restrictions that apply to the federal government, applying them to state governments by incorporating
those rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. For example, the First
Amendment restriction that Congress may not abridge the freedom of religion has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to state government action. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Similarly, courts generally have extended restrictions that apply to
state governments to the federal government. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction that states may not deny equal protection of the laws has been extended to the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For the purposes of this essay, I do not distinguish between federal and state governments, but refer to them collectively as "government."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Government may not directly interfere with these activities unless it proves
that its conduct survives the judicial tests used to interpret the relevant constitutional provision.
In our modem administrative state, direct government action has given
way increasingly to indirect government action, often by government attaching
conditions to benefits. This procedural change presents a substantive problem:
can the government shield itself from judicial scrutiny by acting indirectly
instead of directly? The unconstitutional conditions doctrine answers this
question in the negative. 6 But a review of arguably unconstitutional welfare
conditions suggests the answer is not so clear.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been assailed from at least
three directions. Some commentators argue that the judiciary's obligation to
provide normal scrutiny to indirect government action is obvious, and that the
doctrine serves no actual purpose, so is superfluous.7 But courts continue to
apply the doctrine.8 Other commentators argue that the doctrine fails to advance a meaningful discourse about the substantive aspects of a dispute.9
Courts, however, have not consistently reached this substance without applying
the doctrine. 0° These critics have yet to articulate precisely how they propose
this substantive analysis will occur without the doctrine. Still other commentators criticize the lack of a theoretical framework underlying the doctrine."
My assertion, contrary to those of many in this symposium,' 2 is that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine could serve a two-fold purpose of (1)
prohibiting courts from deeming acquiescence to a condition to be a waiver of
constitutional rights, and (2) requiring courts instead to apply normal doctrinal
tests to both direct and indirect government action.
What happens when courts ignore the doctrine in the context of welfare
benefits reveals the practical need for the doctrine. In those few instances

6. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-5, at 781 (2d ed.
1988) ("The notion that, whenever a privilege or benefit might be withheld altogether, it may be
withheld on whatever conditions government chooses to impose, has been repeatedly repudiated
since the mid-20th century.").
7. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see also Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a
Taking, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 893 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: UnconstitutionalConditions
and Welfare, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 931 (1995).
10. Cases like Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (ignoring the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and applying only rationality review to the maximum benefit limitation) demonstrate that the Court is less likely to reach the substantive import of the benefit or the harm of
the condition when politically unpopular benefits such as welfare are at issue. Thus, Dorothy
Roberts' argument may leave the very parties she is concerned about-welfare mothers-out in
the cold.
11. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); see also Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 1007 (1995).
12. While most commentators in this symposium criticized the doctrine, some attempted to
identify the value of the unconstitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 859 (1995); see also Roberto
L. Corrada, Justifying a Search for a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 72 DENY.
U. L. REv. 1011 (1995).
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when the Supreme Court recognized the danger of unscrutinized indirect government action through conditions tied to welfare benefits, it engaged in careful scrutiny of the action under the appropriate constitutional doctrines.'3 But
when the Court emphasized the voluntariness of the government providing
welfare benefits and/or the recipient's choice to request and accept welfare
benefits, it either refused to scrutinize the constitutionality of the government
action at any level, 4 or reduced its scrutiny to a level lower than the doctrinal norm. 5 Unfortunately for welfare recipients, the Court typically has
followed the latter approach, holding that because government does not have
to provide any welfare benefits, it may condition those benefits as it desires. 6
Doctrinally speaking, the Court has more frequently ignored the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with regard to welfare conditions, instead adopting
its antithesis: government's greater power to deny welfare benefits includes the
lesser power to grant welfare benefits on any conditions it desires. 7 Such
reasoning has allowed the Court either to refuse to scrutinize the government
action, or to reduce the level of scrutiny it applies to the action.
If benefits are popular, such as building permits, courts tend to apply the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and carefully scrutinize the conditions attached to those benefits. For example, the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,'" recently struck down the city of Tigard's requirement that Ms.
Dolan provide a greenway on her land before she could expand her business
area. The Court reasoned that the city could not directly force Ms. Dolan to
build a floodplain and bicycle path, so it could not do so indirectly by conditioning her building permit on allowing this environmental protection on her
property.' 9 For my purposes, it is important to note that the Court in Dolan at
least implicitly directed that the doctrine should apply across the Constitution.20 Thus, the Court demanded consistency among various constitutional

13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applied normal equal protection
strict scrutiny for alleged violations of fundamental rights and invalidated statutory classification
denying welfare benefits to individuals who had not resided in state for one year immediately
preceding application).
14. See, e.g., Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990) (summarily rejecting claim that welfare work requirement violated the Thirteenth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra parts II.A. and B.
16. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying only rationality review
to uphold maximum benefit limitations on AFDC).
17. Justice Holmes deserves credit for the "greater power includes the lesser power" argument. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."); Howard E. Abrams, Economic Analysis and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 359, 386 n.109 (1990) (noting attribution to Justice
Holmes). Some refer to the greater-includes-the-lesser argument as taking the bitter with the sweet.
For example, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures that are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant ...must take the bitter with the sweet." Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
153-54 (1974).
18. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
19. Id. at 2317 (explicitly adopting the "well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional
conditions').
20. Id. at 2320 ("We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be rele-
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provisions. But it has not demanded similar consistency among different benefit contexts involving the same constitutional provision. Regardless of the constitutional provision at issue, the Court frequently has applied relaxed or no
scrutiny to challenged conditions of welfare. 2
While recognizing its uneven application, I argue that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, when applied, serves as an important procedural mechanism to prevent courts from refusing or reducing scrutiny. Under the doctrine,
courts should apply that level of scrutiny normally used for the relevant constitutional provision. In other words, I propose that courts should fully and
consistently apply the doctrine instead of employing it in the context-selective
way they currently do.
I further suggest that the fact of the judiciary's frequent failure to apply
normal doctrinal scrutiny to benefits attached to welfare should give pause to
those commentators concerned about meaningful justice for poor people who
urge that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine be abandoned.22 I assert
instead that the doctrine's procedural function, namely preventing a court from
refusing or reducing judicial scrutiny, in turn serves the goal of requiring the
court to reach at least the doctrinal merits and to fairly conduct the same substantive evaluation that it would use for direct government actions.
II. CONTEXT MATTERS: WELFARE CONDITIONS AS PRESUMPTIVELY
CONSTITUTIONAL

To explore the importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, I
focus on what happens when courts ignore the doctrine in their review of
challenged conditions to welfare benefits. By "welfare" I mean need-based
cash assistance, particularly Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") or its state-based equivalent.23
I have chosen, for illustrative purposes, two constitutional provisions not
typically associated with challenges brought by welfare recipients. While many
welfare recipients have raised due process and equal protection claims, fewer
have brought challenges under the Free Exercise or Takings Clauses of the
Constitution. Moreover, the level of importance placed on religious liberty and
property rights tends to correlate conversely with values placed on welfare. In
other words, I assume for purposes of this essay that more conservative thinkers who may disfavor welfare benefits may favor heightened judicial scrutiny

gated to the status of poor relation in these comparable circumstances.").
21. 1 examine here, not whether the Court has been consistent with regard to welfare across
various constitutional provisions, but rather whether the Court has been consistent with regard to
various types of benefits involving the same constitutional provision. For one commentator's view

on the former question, see Lynn Baker's analysis asserting that the Court has applied a consistent
economic approach to conditions attached to welfare. Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Lynn
A. Baker, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 DENv. U. L. REV. 949 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 9.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 1 include the new state-structured
incarnations of AFDC that will result if Congress enacts its current welfare reform proposal to

replace AFDC with block grant funds which states will allocate.
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of government interference with religious liberty or property rights. Similarly,
I assume that more progressive thinkers who favor welfare benefits may favor
heightened judicial scrutiny of any interference with these benefits, regardless
of what level of scrutiny normally applies for the constitutional provision at
issue. Thus, I hope to present several related challenges.
First, for those who might favor strong free exercise or takings scrutiny, I
ask what it is about welfare that justifies jettisoning normal scrutiny. Or, why
should scrutiny be lowered below normal for conditions attached to welfare?
Second, for those who might favor the highest scrutiny for welfare recipients,
I ask what it is about welfare that justifies increasing scrutiny. Or, why should
scrutiny be raised above normal? Third, for those who identify with neither of
these camps, I ask what it is about welfare that justifies any review departing
from normal scrutiny applied for the constitutional provision at issue. Or, why
put any additional thumb on the scale?
A comparison of several Supreme Court decisions in welfare and nonwelfare contexts serves to flesh out these issues. The first set of cases address
free exercise challenges and the second set of cases address takings claims.
A. Free Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from directly requiring
or prohibiting religious beliefs or conduct. 4 When the government acts only
indirectly by withholding a benefit because the recipient's religious beliefs
prevented her from satisfying relevant conditions, what analysis do courts
employ to address the challenge that the condition is unconstitutional?
1. Sherbert's Establishment of Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court seemingly answered this question in Sherbert v.
Verner25 when it applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a condition requiring a Seventh-Day Adventist to work on her Sabbath to be eligible
for unemployment insurance benefits. Sherbert challenged the condition as a
violation of her right to the free exercise of her religion. The Court reasoned
that a law "is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."26 The Court further held that violations of the

24. Both the Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses occur in the farst phrase of the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .

25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)). The
Court continued:
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives
solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that
practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.
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Free Exercise Clause would be subject to strict scrutiny," requiring the state
to show that "no alternative forms of regulation" would serve an identified
"compelling state interest."2 South Carolina asserted as its interest the reduction of fraudulent claims filed by claimants feigning religious objections to
Saturday work.' Because the state's condition failed to survive strict scrutiny
(presumably because the state failed to prove that requiring religious objectors
to accept available work was necessary to prevent fraud), the Court held that
the state could not apply its eligibility requirements "so as to constrain a
worker to abandon" her religious convictions."
The Supreme Court repeatedly has reaffirmed Sherbert's use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to apply full scrutiny to conditions attached
to economic benefits in Thomas v. Review Board,3 Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission,32 and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security.33 In Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of unemployment
benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in a foundry making
military equipment because doing so violated his beliefs.34 Similarly, in
Hobbie, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays.3" Finally, in
Frazee, the Court reversed the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian
who refused to work Sundays because doing so violated his beliefs.36 In each
of these cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny, even though the character of
the government action was indirect rather than direct, and struck down the
government conditions because they violated each claimant's religious liber37

ty.

2. Roy's Suggestion of Mere Rationality
In Bowen v. Roy,3" the Supreme Court departed from the well-established
standard of strict scrutiny for conditions attached to economic benefits. The
Court instead split about how the welfare context might alter the level of

27. Id. at 406-07. Prior to this formal announcement that courts should apply strict scrutiny
to free exercise challenges, the Court had decided three cases that appeared to apply the two-part

(least restrictive alternative and compelling interest) strict scrutiny test: Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (reversed application of permit requirement to Jehovah's Witness who engaged in religious soliciting because less restrictive means were available to prevent fraud and
litter); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversed application of breach of peace
prohibition and religious solicitation certification requirement to Jehovah's Witnesses who engaged
in religious canvassing because less restrictive means were available to limit noise); and Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (reversed application of licensing fee requirement for religious canvassing and soliciting because less restrictive means were available to raise revenue from
solicitors). See generally TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-13, at 1251-53.
28. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07.
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id. at 410.
31. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
32. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
33. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
34. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
35. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141.
36. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
37. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141; Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
38. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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review from normal strict scrutiny. Although commentators often categorize
Roy as a case about government freedom to efficiently administer a program," the lively battle within the Court centers on how the nature of welfare benefits should affect the level of scrutiny the Court should apply.
In Roy, the federal government required Native American parents, Stephen
Roy and Karen Miller, to provide a social security number for their daughter,
Little Bird of the Snow, as an eligibility requirement for AFDC and Food
Stamps. Roy and Miller challenged the federal government's requirements (1)
that applicants provide a social security number, and (2) states utilize that
number in their administration of AFDC, on the grounds that assigning a
social security number to their daughter violated their religious beliefs.'
The Court reasoned that because the family's religious liberty could not
"be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs
in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens," their
challenge to the government's use of their daughter's social security number
failed."' But the Court fragmented over whether the government could require
provision of a social security number as a condition of eligibility for AFDC
benefits.42
Three members of the Court, then-Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist ("the Burger Three"), focused on the context of welfare,
emphasizing that the parents made a voluntary choice to seek benefits from
the government:
[The social security number provision requirement] may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no sense does
it affirmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain
from religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they
find objectionable for religious reasons. Rather, it is appellees who
seek benefits from the Government and who assert that, because of
certain religious beliefs, they should be excused from compliance
with a condition that is binding on all other persons who seek the
same benefits from the Government.43
Although the Burger Three conceded that the provision requirement involved
some government compulsion," they viewed the denial of benefits by this
"neutral" statute as less intrusive than what they called "affirmative compulsion or prohibition."45 Because the minimal compulsion involved in condi39. Both William Marshall and Jane Rutherford expressed this view of Roy to me during the
symposium.
40. Roy, 476 U.S. at 697. The District Court entered a two-part injunction, restraining the
government from (1) the use of Little Bird of the Snow's social security number and (2) denying
benefits due to her parents' failure to provide a number for her. Id. at 698.
41. Id. at 699-700.
42. Two Justices, Blackmun and Stevens, stayed out of the fray regarding the welfare context, apparently because they found the provision requirement to be either not ripe or moot based
on the court's holding that use of the number was allowed. These two nevertheless agreed to
vacate the injunction against the provision requirement, thus confusing the count about who held
what. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
43. Roy, 476 U.S. at 703.
44. Id. at 704 ("[W]e do not believe that no government compulsion is involved .....
45. id. ("[W]e cannot ignore the reality that denial of such benefits by a uniformly applica-
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tions attached to benefits was different than direct governmental compulsion,
the Burger Three concluded that these different types of regulation could not
be governed by the same constitutional standard.' Thus, they reasoned, the
less intrusive nature of conditions attached to benefits justifies reducing the
level of scrutiny that courts should apply to review them.47
Specifically, the Burger Three would have reduced the Court's review
from normal strict scrutiny to mere rationality." Rather than require the government to prove that no alternative regulation would serve the government's
compelling interest, they merely required the government to prove that the
condition was a reasonable means of serving the government's legitimate
interest.4 In applying this reduced scrutiny, the Burger Three identified the
prevention of fraud as an important government interest. 0 Moreover, they
reasoned that use of a social security number was a reasonable means to prevent fraud because of what they saw as the costly and gratuitous nature of
welfare.
Regarding the nature of welfare, the Burger Three emphasized its "staggering magnitude," noting the number of families and amounts spent on both
AFDC and Food Stamps." They touted the government's use of social security numbers to cross-match welfare applicants and recipients as the most costeffective means to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.52 Returning to their emphasis of the recipients' choice, they concluded that Roy and Miller could not
use the Free Exercise Clause "to demand Government benefits, but only on
their own terms, particularly where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage to the Government in the administration of the programs."53
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separately to explain their
view that no justiciable controversy remained regarding whether the government could require parents to provide the number, because the government
could use the number that already had been assigned.54 Neither concluded,

ble statute neutral on its face is of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications.").
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 706-07 ("A governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review
simply because it is indirect, but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the burden.").
48. Id. at 707-08 ("[T]he Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.").
49. Id.
50. Id. at 709.
51. Id. at 710 ("Each year roughly 3.8 million families receive $7.8 billion through federally
funded AFDC programs and 20 million persons receive $11 billion in food stamps.").
52. ld. at 710-11.
53. Id. at 711-12.
54. Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result). A majority of the Court-the Burger Three combined with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens-agreed that both the injunction against use of a social security number
and the injunction against requiring provision of such a number be vacated. Id. at 712 (Chief
Justice Burger announcing the judgment of the Court vacating the injunctions entered by the District Court), 713 (Justice Blackmun noting that he joins vacating the injunction against use of the
number and agrees to vacate and remand the injunction against requiring provision of the number), 716 (Justice Stevens concurring in the result).
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however, that mere rationality should govern whether requiring a social security number violated the Free Exercise Clause.55 Indeed, Justice Blackmun indicated his approval of strict scrutiny by noting that, when reached, the provision issue required "nothing more than a straightforward application" of the
Sherbert line of cases.56
The real dispute in the case was between the Burger Three and the
O'Connor Three. In a separate opinion for herself and Justices Brennan and
Marshall, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Burger Three that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the government from using a social security number, but argued that Sherbert and its progeny established strict scrutiny as the
proper standard of review57 and that the government here failed to survive
such scrutiny in defending the provision requirement. The O'Connor Three
characterized the goal of preventing welfare fraud as "laudable and compelling," 8 but belittled its application as merely "the unanchored anxieties of the
'
welfare bureaucracy."59
The problem, according to the O'Connor Three, was
the government's failure to prove the requisite fit between the chosen means
of using social security numbers and the desired end of preventing fraud. In
short, the government failed to convince the O'Connor Three that granting a
religious exemption to these Native American applicants would harm its interest in preventing fraud.'
Finally, unlike the Burger Three, the O'Connor Three viewed Sherbert as
controlling, explaining that "[t]he fact that the underlying dispute involves an
award of benefits rather than an exaction of penalties does not grant the Government license to apply a different version of the Constitution."' They also
noted that Sherbert rejected the argument that indirect burdens through conditions attached to benefits could be analyzed any differently than direct burdens.62
In a separate dissent, Justice White argued that Sherbert and Thomas
controlled Roy.6" Thus, five justices' agreed that the Court should apply
strict scrutiny to the social security number provision requirement. Yet the
Court did not apply that strict scrutiny. And while it remanded the case, it did
not clearly direct the lower courts on remand to apply strict scrutiny.65

55. Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 716 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result).
56. Id. at 715-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
57. Indeed, five justices would have applied strict scrutiny to the extent that the case was not
moot (Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White). Id. at 731.
58. Id. at 726.
59. Id. at 730.
60. Id. at 732.
61. Id. at 731.
62. Id.
at 731-32.
63. Id. at 733.
64. Id. at 731 (counting Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White).
65. The Court vacated the injunction prohibiting the state from both using and requiring
provision of a social security number, and remanded the case. Id. at 712.
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Comparing Sherbert with Roy

What happened in Roy? Can it be understood by the fact that the parties
discovered quite late that a social security number had been issued for Little
Bird of the Snow, thus creating doubts about whether the government would
still enforce the requirement that her parents cooperate in providing a number
for her? Perhaps. Certainly two justices thought the justiciability questions
were key. But seven justices thought that the matter was justiciable, and that
the debate centered on whether normal free exercise strict scrutiny should be
applied when welfare benefits were at issue. Without this debate, the Court in
Roy should have simply applied Sherbert's strict scrutiny. Indeed, three years
after Roy, a unanimous Court reaffirmed Sherbert's strict scrutiny test in
Frazee. But that case again involved unemployment insurance benefits rather
than AFDC.' Not even Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent in Frazee, as he had
done to criticize Sherbert in Thomas in 1981 and in Hobbie in 1987.67 Why
not?
How is Roy so different from Sherbert? Both involved benefits for which
the recipients voluntarily chose to apply. Both involved neutral conditionsaccepting available work and providing a social security number. Sherbert did
not involve any more "affirmative compulsion" by the government than
Roy.' Both imposed similar administrative burdens, requiring government to
make exceptions for religious objectors. In both cases, the government's justification was the prevention of fraud. Given these similarities, why did the
Court apply strict scrutiny to invalidate the condition in Sherbert, but not in
Roy?
Perhaps the answer lies in evaluating the difference between unemployment insurance benefits and welfare benefits. Both programs are part of our
government safety net to assist people who lack necessary income. But the
former is more like an insurance program, where benefits are drawn from
premiums paid on behalf of a working person and where benefit amounts
correlate to past earnings.' Welfare benefits, such as AFDC and Food
Stamps, are not earnings-based, but are need-based.
The Sherbert-Roy comparison suggests different standards for earningsbased versus need-based benefits. Perhaps the earnings-based and need-based
difference explains the primary political difference: unemployment insurance
benefits are popular and welfare benefits are not. Read with this understanding, Roy suggests that the popularity of a government benefit determines the
level of judicial scrutiny applied to an arguably unconstitutional condition on
the benefit. But nothing in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine supports
such a distinction. The doctrine instead seems designed precisely to ensure that

66. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832, 835 (1989).
67. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987).
68. If anything, Roy involved more compulsion than Sherbert, due to the destitute circumstances of welfare recipients compared to unemployment insurance beneficiaries. See Julie A.
Nice, Welfare Servitude, I GEo. J. FIGHTING POvERTY 340 (1994).
69. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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recipients subjected to popular conditions attached to unpopular benefits receive constitutional protection, particularly since presumably they are more
likely to be burdened with conditions than are recipients of popular benefits.
The popularity difference may also explain the contrast between welfare
and non-welfare benefits in a different constitutional context. The next section
compares the scrutiny applied in takings clause challenges to conditions attached to building permits and welfare benefits.
B. Takings
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation." In recent years,
the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to regulatory takings made
by the government.7 Specifically, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,72 the Court established heightened scrutiny as the proper standard of review and struck down the government's condition that a homeowner provide a
public access easement along a beach because the
condition bore an insuffi73
cient relation to a legitimate government interest.
1. Nollan's (and Dolan's) Heightened Scrutiny
The Supreme Court in Nollan established heightened scrutiny as the proper standard for reviewing the California Coastal Commission's condition that
the Nollans provide a public easement along their beach-front property in
exchange for a building permit to replace a bungalow with a three-bedroom
home.74 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia invoked the "long recognized" requirement that the government prove that its taking substantially
advances legitimate state interests.75 He acknowledged that the government
held the greater power to prohibit construction of the house, and that it might
have held the lesser power to condition construction upon some concession by
the owner. Justice Scalia's analysis did not end, however, with the "greater
power includes the lesser power" concession. He further required that, in order
for the condition to not constitute extortion, it had to survive his "essential
nexus" test, meaning that the condition must further the same end served by
the outright prohibition.76 Because the Court found that the public access

70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring proof of a
substantial "nexus" between the government's condition attached to property and the government's
legitimate interest); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994) (requiring proof of
"rough proportionality" between the government's condition attached to property and the
government's interest).
72. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). I focus on Nollan, rather than Dolan, because it was decided in
such close proximity (the day after) to the welfare benefits case I use for comparison, Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
73. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-34.
74. Id. at 828.
75. Id. at 834.
76. Id. at 837.

19951

MAKING CONDITIONS CONSTITUTIONAL

easement condition did not serve the same ends as prohibition of construction,
it struck down the easement condition as a violation of the Takings Clause."
Later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court explicitly adopted the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, reaffirmed Nollan's heightened scrutiny for
takings conditions, and required the government to prove that its condition
served its justification with "rough proportionality."78
2.

Gilliard'sMere Rationality

The day before it applied strict scrutiny to strike down a condition on use
79
of real property in Nollan, the Court decided Bowen v. Gilliard.
In Gilliard,
the Court applied mere rationality to uphold against a takings challenge two
related government conditions to welfare benefits. The first condition required
inclusion of a child not in need of welfare into the welfare family unit.s" The
second condition required assignment of that child's parental support payments
to the state to repay the family's welfare benefits.8' The relevant issue in
Gilliard was whether the government's taking of these parental support payments that belonged to the non-needy child violated the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.82
The majority in Gilliard rejected heightened scrutiny and went to some
lengths to establish mere rationality as the appropriate level of review. They
purportedly invoked rationality review in deference to Congress' authority to
determine how to allocate government benefits enacted pursuant to its plenary
power to make spending decisions. 3 They also reiterated a string-cite from
Dandridge v. Williams that sets out various statements of the rationality standard.8" Applying this rationality review, they concluded that the provision

77. After setting out heightened scrutiny as the proper standard, Justice Scalia implied, however, that the condition here did not survive even rationality review. He specified that the public
access easement condition failed "even the most untailored standards" because public access along
the Nollans' beach in no way served to reduce visual access to the beach from the street, or to
reduce the public's perceived barrier to the beach, or to remedy any additional congestion. Id. at
838.
78. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
79. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
80. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 591-94 (explaining that Congress amended the AFDC statute in
1984 to require families to include in the filing unit children receiving non-custodial parental support payments).
81. Id. at 591 (describing the AFDC requirement that applicants for assistance assign to the
state the right to receive non-custodial parental support payments for any member of the family
filing unit).
82. I do not argue here that welfare benefits themselves constitute private property for purposes of takings analysis. While that argument might be plausible, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of welfare benefits as property for purposes of due process analysis in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), I do not reach this argument for purposes of this article's
analysis. I focus instead on the court's analysis of child support payments, which constituted the
property at issue in Gilliard.
83. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 596-98. The Court failed to mention that its own spending power
analysis prohibits Congress from violating other constitutional prohibitions. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
84. Giliard,483 U.S. at 601 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("If the classification has some
'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."'); Metropolis
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requiring assignment of a child's parental support payments to the government
unquestionably served Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures,85
and rationally served the government's interest in allocating benefits among
needy families.86
When the Court examined whether the inclusion of a child's parental
support payments in computing the rest of the family's income constituted a
taking, it adopted a no-benefits baseline," applied the "greater power includes
the lesser power" argument,8 then upheld the inclusion requirement. After
finding that the government's greater power to deny welfare includes the lesser power to condition it, the Court did not subject the inclusion requirement to
any additional scrutiny similar to the heightened scrutiny for regulatory takings
it established in Nollan the following day.
When considering assignment of the child support payments to the government, however, the Court considered the three factors it normally evaluates
for takings analysis: the economic impact of the taking, the expectation in the
property interest, and the character of the government action. First, the Court
minimized the economic impact of the assignment on the child by assuming
that AFDC parents would spread all available income to support the family, no
matter its source.89 Second, the Court minimized the child's expectation of
continued receipt of support payments, reasoning that support payments are
not fixed but may be modified by law.*
In analyzing the third factor, the Court's view of welfare again played the
pivotal role. Regarding the character of the government's action in requiring
assignment of child support payments, the Court opined that welfare requires
government "to make hard choices and to balance various incentives" in allocating funds.9 ' More importantly, the Court again invoked the choice argument, stating,
[tihe law does not require any custodial parent to apply for AFDC
benefits. Surely it is reasonable to presume that a parent who does

Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) ("The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be,
and unscientific."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."))).
85. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 599.
86. Id.
87. The Court explained that it must consider the condition from the baseline of no welfare
benefits:
Had no AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress then instituted a
program that took into account support payments that a family receives, it is hard to
believe that we would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit program
constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits are in place and Congress sees a
need to reduce them in order to save money and to distribute limited resources more
fairly, the "takings" label seems to have a bit more plausibility. For legal purposes
though, the two situations are identical.
Id. at 604.
88. Id. ("Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound to
continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level.").
89. Id. at 606-07.
90. Id. at 607-08.
91. Id. at 608-09.
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make such an application does so because she or he is convinced that
the family as a whole-as well as each child committed to her or his
custody-will be better off with the benefits than without.92
Although the Court appeared to apply takings analysis to the assignment
condition, it jettisoned normal scrutiny midstream, again relying on the nature
of welfare to justify lower scrutiny. The Court then concluded its decision as it
had begun, by reiterating its commitment to mere rationality for conditions
affecting welfare because "the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the
93
business of this Court.
3.

Comparing Nollan/Dolan with Gilliard

How are building permits different than welfare benefits for the purpose
of scrutinizing arguably unconstitutional conditions? First, the government has
the greater power to deny both building permits and welfare benefits, so neither benefit is an absolute right.94 In both instances, government acts indirectly, rather than directly. Second, both applicants have a choice of whether
to request the benefit or not. Third, both conditions are neutral insofar as they
do not target any subset of applicants, but apply to all. Fourth, Nollan and
Dolan did not involve any more affirmative compulsion by the government
than did Gilliard.Fifth, courts typically give great deference to the legislatures
in both land use regulation and welfare administration. Finally, both involve
legitimate government interests: environmental protection and cost-saving.
Thus, they seem to present similar unconstitutional conditions problems. Yet
the Court treated them differently. Again, perhaps the reason is that building
permits are popular and welfare benefits are not.
The votes in Nollan and Gilliard turned on whether (popular) property
rights, or (unpopular) welfare benefits were at issue. Now-Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia applied heightened scrutiny to invalidate the public access easement condition in Nollan."
These same justices applied only rationality review to uphold the parental
96
support assignment condition in Gilliard.
Similarly, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun would have applied rationality review and would have
upheld the public access easement condition in Nollan.97 These same justices
would have applied heightened scrutiny and would have invalidated the parental support assignment condition in Gilliard.9s

92. Id.
93. Id. at 609.
94. But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (implying
owners have a right to build on property but children have no right to parental support payments).
95. Id. at 834.
96. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 603.
97. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 865
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Gilliard,483 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting), at 633 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Only Justice Stevens remained consistent in result, voting to uphold both conditions,
but switching from writing for the majority, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia in Gilliard, to dissenting along with Justices Brennan, Mar-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

The primary differences between Nollan and Gilliardwere (1) the property at issue-real property as compared to child support payments, and (2) the
benefit at issue-building permits as compared to welfare grants. The Court's
analyses in the two cases, however, turned not on the difference in the property at issue, but rather on the difference in benefits at issue. Building permit
conditions received strict scrutiny while welfare benefit conditions received
mere rationality review. But both involved takings challenges, so the same test
should have applied.
Comparing Nollan and Gilliardreveals the Court's context-driven dichotomy that disadvantages welfare benefits but not other government benefits. In
Nollan, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a building permit condition
and determined that it was invalid. But when reviewing a condition attached to
welfare, the Court refused to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine (as
it was urged to do, in effect, by Justice Brennan in dissent)," and instead
invoked its antithesis, the "greater power includes the lesser power" argument,
to first circumvent and then dispose of normal takings analysis."r The Court
insisted, both at the beginning and at the end of Gilliard, that, for welfare
benefits, the context necessarily limits judicial scrutiny to mere rationality, regardless of the constitutional doctrine at issue.
III. CONTEXT SHOULD NOT MATTER
I do not argue here, though I believe it plausible, that courts might have a
duty to heighten their scrutiny of conditions attached to welfare-perhaps even
a duty to scrutinize welfare conditions at a higher level than conditions attached to unemployment benefits or building permits, because a greater danger
of legislative oppression threatens unpopular people and causes.' ' I do suggest, at the very least, that conditions attached to welfare deserve no less scrutiny than those attached to unemployment benefits or building permits.
As discussed above, both the welfare and non-welfare benefits challenged
pursuant to the Free Exercise and Takings Clauses involved quite similar characteristics. The government had the greater power to deny the benefit in each
case; all applicants voluntarily chose to apply for the benefit; all conditions
were neutral; the invalidated conditions did not involve any more affirmative
compulsion by the government than the allowed conditions; and all involved
legitimate government interests. No comparative difference justifies the inconsistent treatment of the welfare and non-welfare conditions. Moreover, selec-

shall, and Blackmun in Nollan. See id. at 589; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. The Court circumvented takings analysis with regard to the government's condition
requiring inclusion of the child support payments for purposes of computing the rest of the
family's income, by citing legislative deference and applying mere rationality analysis. The Court
rejected the existence of a taking with regard to the government's condition requiring assignment
of the child support payments, in particular by citing deference to legislative welfare decisions and
emphasizing a welfare parents' choice to apply for benefits. Id. at 598-603, 604-09.
101. See Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995); see also Nice, supra note
68.
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tive ignorance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine transgresses other
principles of constitutional interpretation.
First, we ought not balkanize our constitutional provisions. We have one
Constitution, with one Free Exercise Clause and one Takings Clause, and each
ought to receive consistent interpretation and application across benefit contexts.
Second, we ought not allow a benefit's political popularity to limit the
strength of a recipient's constitutional rights. In other words, courts ought to
be committed to evenhanded' 2 treatment of benefit recipients, regardless
how popular they may or may not be. They all deserve their day in court to
receive similar merit-based analysis.
Third, we ought not allow courts to trump the primary purpose underlying
a constitutional provision with selective loyalty to legislative deference. It is
worse to apply less scrutiny to welfare conditions than to unemployment or
building permit conditions, because doing so works a sort of reverse-strictscrutiny, which hardly seems to comport with the protection of any constitutional provision, let alone with the strong textual protection afforded constitutional guarantees such as the Free Exercise and Takings Clauses. 3
Finally, if any context should matter, it should be that of our modem
administrative state. Because government regulates so many aspects of contemporary life, the danger that exceptions for indirect government regulation
will swallow the normal constitutional rules is truly frightening."° In practical terms then, courts should take a realistic view of regulatory coercion, recognizing that it less frequently takes the form of outright prohibition, but nevertheless presents grave dangers to freedom if left unscrutinized, and thus
unchecked, by the courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is no knight in shining armor on
behalf of poor people. Its application up to now has left much to be desired,
particularly because courts feel free to ignore it or apply it selectively, thereby
weakening its power. Specifically, courts consistently ignore the unconstitu-

102. See Sullivan, supra note 1.
103. Rehnquist seemed to defend this sort of reverse-strict-scrutiny in his dissent in Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) ("We concluded [in a previous case] that "[tlo strike
down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i.e. legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself,
would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.") (citation omitted).
104. As Justice Brennan expressed in Gilliard:
The very pervasiveness of modem government, however, creates an unparalleled opportunity for intrusion on personal life. In a society in which most persons receive some
form of government benefit, government has considerable leverage in shaping individual
behavior. In most cases, we acknowledge that government may wield its power even
when its actions likely influence choices involving personal behavior. On certain occasions, however, government intrusion into private life is so direct and substantial that we
must deem it intolerable if we are to be true to our belief that there is a boundary between the public citizen and the private person.
Gilliard,483 U.S. at 610.
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tional conditions doctrine in the welfare context and typically either refuse or
reduce judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, the doctrine is an important procedural
tool that courts ought to use consistently, applying the normal doctrinal analysis for the relevant constitutional provision, regardless of the type of benefit at
issue.
Persuading courts of their duty to apply the doctrine evenhandedly may
save an impoverished person's claim from being summarily rejected based on
a presumed or deemed waiver of constitutional rights. While no doctrine effectively prevents judges from ultimately placing their contempt for welfare on
the scales of judgment and perverting the substance of our constitutional guarantees, it may deter some courts from doing so, and serve to more clearly
reveal when others do.

